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Abstract
We propose a novel data-dependent structured gradient regularizer to increase the
robustness of neural networks vis-a-vis adversarial perturbations. Our regularizer
can be derived as a controlled approximation from first principles, leveraging the
fundamental link between training with noise and regularization. It adds very little
computational overhead during learning and is simple to implement generically
in standard deep learning frameworks. Our experiments provide strong evidence
that structured gradient regularization can act as an effective first line of defense
against attacks based on low-level signal corruption.1
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks, in particular convolutional neural networks (CNNs), have been used with great
success for perceptual tasks such as image classification [31] or speech recognition [12]. However, it
has been shown that the accuracy of models obtained by standard training methods can dramatically
deteriorate in the face of so-called adversarial examples [33, 10], i.e. small perturbations in the input
signal, typically imperceptible to humans, that are sufficient to induce large changes in the output.
This apparent vulnerability is worrisome as CNNs start to proliferate in the real-world, including in
safety-critical deployments.
Although the theoretical aspects of vulnerability to adversarial perturbations are not yet fully under-
stood, a plethora of methods has been proposed to find adversarial examples. These often transfer
or generalize across different architectures and datasets [26, 17, 35], enabling black-box attacks
even for inaccessible models. The most direct and commonly used strategy of protection is to use
adversarial examples during training, see e.g. [10, 21]. This raises the question, of whether one can
generalize across such examples in order to become immune to a wider range of possible adversarial
perturbations. Otherwise there appears to be a danger of overfitting to a specific attack, in particular
if adversarial examples are sparsely generated from the training set.
In this paper, we pursue a different route, starting from the hypothesis that the weakness revealed
by adversarial examples first and foremost hints at an overfitting or data scarcity problem. Inspired
by the classical work of [1] and similar in spirit to [20], we thus propose regularization as the
preferred remedy to increase model robustness. Our regularization approach comes without rigid
a priori assumptions on the model structure and filters [2] as well as strong (and often overly drastic)
1Code will be made available at https://github.com/rothk
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requirements such as layer-wise Lipschitz bounds [4] or isotropic smoothness [20]. Instead, we will
rely on the ease of generating adversarial examples to learn an informative regularizer, focusing on
the correlation structure of the adversarial noise. Our structured gradient regularizer consistently
outperforms structure-agnostic baselines on long-range correlated perturbations, achieving over 25%
higher classification accuracy. We thus consider our regularization approach a first line of defense on
top of which even more sophisticated defense mechanisms may be built.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We provide evidence that current adversarial attacks act by perturbing the short-range
covariance structure of signals.
• We propose Structured Gradient Regularization (SGR), a data-dependent regularizer in-
formed by the covariance structure of adversarial perturbations.
• We present an efficient SGR implementation with low memory footprint.
• We introduce a long-range correlated adversarial attack against which SGR-regularized
classifiers are shown to be robust.
2 Adversarial Robust Learning
2.1 Virtual Examples
Imagine we had access to a set of transformations τ ∈ T of inputs that leave outputs invariant.
Then we could augment our training data by expanding each real example (xi, yi) into virtual
examples (τ(xi), yi). This approach is simple and widely-applicable, e.g. for exploiting known data
invariances [29], and can greatly increase the statistical power of learning. A similar stochastic
method has been suggested by [18]: a noisy channel or perturbation Q corrupts x 7→ x˜ with
probability Q(x˜|x), leading to an altered (more precisely: convolved) joint distribution PQ(x˜, y) =
P (y)
∫
P (x|y)Q(x˜|x)dx.
Where could such a corruption model come from? We propose to use a generative mechanism to
learn adversarial corruptions from examples. In fact, we will use a simple additive noise model in
this paper,
Q(x˜|x) = Q(ξ := x˜− x), E[ξξ>] = Σ . (1)
Our focus will be on leveraging the correlation structure of the noise, captured by the matrix of raw
second moments Σˆ, aggregated as a running exponentially weighted batch estimate computed from
adversarial perturbations ξi, obtained by methods such as FGSM [10], PGD [19] or DeepFool [22].
2.2 Robust Multiclass Learning Objective
Once we have an estimate of Q available, we propose to optimize any standard training criterion
(e.g. a likelihood function) in expectation over a mixing distribution between the uncorrupted
and the corrupted data. For the sake of concreteness, let us focus on the multiclass case, where
y ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. Define a probabilistic classifier
φ : Rd →4K , 4K := {pi ∈ RK+ : 1>pi = 1} . (2)
For a given loss function ` such as the negative log-loss, `(y, pi) = − log piy , our aim is to minimize
L(φ)=(1−λ)EPˆ [`(y,φ(x))]+λEPˆQ [`(y,φ(x))] , (3)
where Pˆ denotes the empirical distribution and PˆQ the noise corrupted distribution. The hyper-
parameter λ gives us a degree of freedom to pay more attention to the training data vs. our (imperfect)
corruption model.
2.3 From Virtual Examples to Regularization
Approaches relying on the explicit generation of adversarial examples face three statistical challenges:
(i) How can enough samples be generated to cover all attacks? (ii) How can we avoid a computational
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blow-up by adding too many virtual examples? (iii) How can we prevent overfitting to a specific
attack? A remedy to these problems is through the use of regularization. The basic idea is simple:
instead of sampling virtual examples, one tries to calculate the corresponding integrals in closed form,
at least under reasonable approximations.
The general connection between regularization and training with noise-corrupted examples has been
firmly established by [1]. The benefits of regularization over adversarially augmented training in
terms of generalization error have been hypothesized in [8]. In [18], properties of the loss function
are exploited to achieve efficient regularization techniques for certain types of noise. Here, we follow
the approach pursued in [28] in using an approximation that is accurate for small noise amplitudes.
3 Structured Gradient Regularization
3.1 From Correlated Noise to Structured Gradient Regularization
To approximate the expectation with regard to the noisy channel, we generalize a recent approach for
gradient regularization of binary classifiers in Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [28]: we
approximate the expectation over corruptions through a Taylor expansion, which subsequently allows
for integrating over perturbations.
For the sake of simplicity of derivations we assume adversarial perturbations to be centered. Let us
Taylor expand the log-component functions, making use of the shortcut ψy := log φy ,
ψy(·+ ξ) = ψy +∇ψ>y ξ + 12ξ>4[ψy]ξ +O(‖ξ‖3) (4)
For any zero-mean distribution Q with second moments Σ,
EQ[ψy(·+ ξ)] = ψy+ 12Tr(4[ψy]Σ)+O(E[‖ξ‖3]). (5)
The Hessian is calculated via the chain rule
4(ψy) = ∇
[∇φy
φy
]
=
4φy
φy
−∇ψy · ∇ψ>y . (6)
We will make a similar argument to [28] to show that it is reasonable to neglect the terms involv-
ing Hessians 4φy. Let us therefore consider the Bayes-optimal classifier φ∗y, for which up to a
normalization constant
φ∗y(x) ∝ P (x|y)P (y) , (7)
such that
EP
[4φ∗y(x)
φ∗y(x)
]
∝
∫ ∑
y
4φ∗y(x)dx . (8)
Exchanging summation and differentiation, we however have as a consequence of the normalization∑
y
4φy(x) = 4
[∑
y
φy(x)
]
= 41 = 0 . (9)
Thus, under the assumption that φ ≈ φ∗ and of small perturbations (such that we can ignore higher
order terms in Eq. (4)), we get
EPQ [ψy(x)] = EP
[
ψy(x)− 12Tr
[∇ψy∇ψ>y Σ]]+O(E[‖ξ‖3]) . (10)
We can turn this into a regularizer by taking the leading terms [28]. Identifying P = Pˆ with the
empirical distribution, we arrive at the following robust learning objective:
Structured Gradient Regularization (SGR)
minφ → LSGR(φ) = EPˆ [− log φy(x)] + λΩΣ(φ) (11)
ΩΣ(φ) :=
1
2
EPˆ
[
∇x log φy(x)>Σ∇x log φy(x)
]
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For uncentered adversarial perturbations EQ[ξ] = µ it is easy to see that the corresponding regularizer
is given by
Ωµ,Σ(φ) = −EPˆ
[
∇ log φ>y (x)µ
]
+ ΩΣ(φ) . (12)
In practice, we however observed this correction to be small.
3.2 Properties
There are a few facts that are important to point out about the derived SGR regularizer.
(i) As the regularizer provides an efficiently computable approximation for an intractable expectation,
it is clearly data-dependent. ΩΣ penalizes loss-gradients evaluated at training points. This is different
from standard regularizers that penalize some norm of the parameter vector, such as L2-regularization.
In the latter case, we would expect the regularizer to have the largest effect in the empty parts of the
input space, where it should reduce the variability of the classifier outputs. On the contrary, ΩΣ has
its main effect around the data manifold. In this sense, it is complementary to standard regularization
methods.
(ii) Moreover, the SGR regularizer is intrinsic in the sense that it does not depend on the parameters
of the classifier (for a good reason, we have not mentioned any parameterization), but instead directly
acts on the function realized by the classifier φ (the relevant gradients measure the sensitivity of φ
with regard to the input x and not with regard to parameters). Thus, it is parameterization invariant
and can be naturally applied to any function space, whether it is finite-dimensional or not.
(iii) We can gain complementary insights into SGR by explicitly computing it in terms of classifier
logits ϕy(x). As outlined in Sec 7.1 in the Appendix, we obtain the following expression for the
structured gradient regularizer
ΩΣ(φ) =
1
2
EPˆ
[
(∇ϕy−〈∇ϕ〉)>Σ(∇ϕy−〈∇ϕ〉)
]
, 〈∇ϕ〉 (x) :=
∑
y
∇ϕy(x)φy(x) (13)
We can therefore see that SGR is penalizing large variations of the class-conditional logit-gradients
∇ϕy around their data-dependent class average 〈∇ϕ〉. For simple one-layer softmax classifiers we
obtain ΩΣ(φ) = 1/2 EPˆ
[
(ωy − 〈ω〉)>Σ (ωy − 〈ω〉)
]
. This suggests an intriguing connection to
variance-based regularization. Weight-decay regularization, on the other hand, simply penalizes large
norms.
3.3 Implementation
The matrix of raw second moments is aggregated through a running exponentially weighted average
Σˆt ← (1−β) Σˆt−1 + β Cov(ξ(1), ..., ξ(m)) (14)
with the decay rate β as a tuneable parameter trading off weighting between current (β→1) and past
(β→0) batch averages2. For low-dimensional data sets, we can directly compute the full matrix
Cov(ξ(1), ..., ξ(m)) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
ξiξ
>
i . (15)
For high-dimensional data sets, we have to resort to more memory-efficient representations leveraging
the sparseness of the covariance matrix and covariance-gradient matrix-vector product. For image
data sets, the covariance matrix can be estimated as a function of the displacement between pixels, as
illustrated in Fig. 2, [
Cov(ξ(1), ..., ξ(m))
]
i j
' CovFun (||i− j||2) (16)
where i = (ir, ic) denotes the 2D pixel location, i denotes the covariance matrix index obtained
by flattening the 2D pixel location into a 1D row-major array such that ir = i% image_width,
ic = i // image_width denote the row and column numbers of pixel i and similar for j respectively.
2We used β=0.1 in all our experiments.
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Algorithm 1 Adversarial SGR. Default values: λ ∈ [0, 1], β = 0.1
Input: Regularization strength λ (noise-to-signal ratio), exponential decay rate β, batch size m
Average diagonal entry of data set variance-covariance matrix c (constant for scaling)
Initial classifier parameters (weights and biases) ω0
while ωt not converged do
Sample minibatch of data {(x(1), y(1)), ..., (x(m), y(m))} ∼ Pˆ.
Compute adversarial perturbations ξ(1), ..., ξ(m)
Compute covariance matrix or covariance function Cov(ξ(1), ..., ξ(m))
Update running average Σˆt ← (1−β) Σˆt−1 + β Cov(ξ(1), ..., ξ(m))
Compute scaling factor σt = c/(Avg[Σˆt]jj)
L(ω) = 1
m
m∑
i=1
[ K∑
k=1
−y(i)k log φk(x(i);ω)
]
ΩΣˆt(ω) =
σt
2m
m∑
i=1
[ K∑
k=1
y
(i)
k ∇x log φk(x(i);ω)> Σˆt∇x log φk(x(i);ω)
]
ωt ← ωt−1 − ∇ω
(
L(ω) + λΩΣˆt(ω)
)∣∣∣
ωt−1
return ωt
The gradient-descent step can be performed with any learning rule. We used Adam in our experiments.
See Sec. 3.3 for an efficient implementation of the covariance gradient product.
Rounding pixel displacements ||i− j||2 to the nearest integer, the covariance function simply becomes
an array of real numbers storing the current estimate of the covariance between two pixels displaced
by the difference in array indices. Note that it is not necessary to update Σˆ at every training step once
a fairly good estimate is available.
In our experiments, we also standardized the covariance matrix such that the average diagonal entry is
of the same order as the average diagonal entry of the data set covariance matrix. This allows for more
intuitive optimization over the regularization strength parameter λ, which can now be interpreted as a
noise-to-signal ratio.
The other crucial quantities needed to evaluate the regularizer are log φyi(xi) for training points
(xi, yi). This is simply the per-sample cross-entropy loss, which is often available as a highly
optimized callable operation in modern deep learning frameworks, reducing the implementation of
the SGR regularizer to merely a few lines of code at very little computational overhead.
4 Experiments
4.1 Experimental Setup
Classifier architectures. We trained Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) [3] with nine hidden
layers (and different numbers of filters for each data set), on CIFAR10 [14] and MNIST [16]. Our
models are identical to those used in [3, 27]. For both data sets, we adopt the following standard
preprocessing and data augmentation scheme [11]: Each training image is zero-padded with four
pixels on each side3, randomly cropped to produce a new image with the original dimensions and
subsequently horizontally flipped with probability one half. We also scale each image to have zero
mean and unit variance when it is passed to the classifier. Further details about the models, the
learning rates and the optimizer can be found in Sec. 7.4 in the Appendix.
Training methods. We train each classifier with a number of different training methods: (i) clean, i.e.
through the standard softmax cross-entropy objective, (ii) clean + L2 weight decay regularization,
(iii) adversarially augmented training, i.e. training the classifier on a mixture of clean and adversarial
examples (iv) GN (gradient-norm) regularized (corresponding to SGR with identity covariance
3We shifted the CIFAR10 data by −0.5 so that padding adds mid rgb-range pixels.
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Figure 1: Covariance matrices of PGD, FGSM and DeepFool perturbations as well as CIFAR10
training set (for comparison). The short-range structure of the perturbations is clearly visible. It is
also apparent that the first two attack methods yield perturbations with almost identical covariance
structure. We are showing a center-crop for better visibility (25% trimmed on each side). For
comparison the matrices were rescaled such that their maximum element has an absolute value of one.4 2 0 2 4
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Figure 2: PGD covariance functions: (Left) intra-channel covariance functions, measuring correla-
tions between identical color channels, (the coloring in the plot matches the corresponding channel),
(right) inter-channel covariance functions, measuring correlations between opposite color channels.
The rapid decay with pixel displacement, indicating very short decay length, is clearly visible.
matrix) and (v) SGR regularized. The SGR covariance matrix was computed from either: (a) loss
gradients, (b) sign of loss gradients, (c) FGSM or (d) PGD perturbations. The performance of these
SGR variants was almost identical in our experiments.
Adversarial attacks. We evaluate the classification accuracy against the following adversarial
attacks: Fast Gradient (Sign) Method (FGM & FGSM) [10], Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [19]
and DeepFool [22]. The attack strength  is reported in units of 1/255. The numbers reported for
the DeepFool attack are computed according to Eq. (2) in [22]. The number of iterations are 10 / 40
(white-box / transfer attack tables) for PGD and 100 for DeepFool. The attacks were implemented
with the open source CleverHans Library [25]. We also implemented a uniform random noise baseline.
Further details and attack hyper-parameters can be found in Sec. 7.2 the Appendix.
4.2 Covariance Structure of Adversarial Perturbations
To investigate the covariance structure of adversarial perturbations, we trained a clean classifier
for 50 epochs and computed adversarial perturbations for every data point in the test set. The 2D
perturbations were flattened into 1D row-major arrays before computing the full covariance matrix4
as described in Section 3.3, Eq. (15).
The short-range correlation structure of the perturbations, shown in Fig. 1, is clearly visible (the
correlations decay much faster than those of the data set covariance matrix). Figure 2 shows the
corresponding PGD covariance functions. The rapid decay with pixel displacement, indicating very
short decay length5, is again evident. It thus seems that an unregularized classifier vulnerable to
adversarial perturbations gives too much weight to short-range correlations (low-level patterns) and
not enough weight to long-range ones (globally relevant high-level features of the data).
4.3 Long-range Correlated Noise Attack
To investigate the effect and potential benefit of using a structured covariance matrix in the SGR
regularizer versus an “unstructured” diagonal covariance, corresponding to simple gradient-norm
4Strictly speaking, Σˆ denotes the matrix of raw second moments. We will refer to Σˆ as the covariance matrix
however, since the difference between the two is safely negligible, with the raw second moments typically being
three orders of magnitude larger than the outer-product of the mean perturbations.
5Decay length is defined as the displacement over which the covariance function decays to 1/e of its value.
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Figure 3: (Left) Accuracy of different models as a function of the LRC attack decay length ζ ∈ [1, 16]
at fixed  = 0.3 (averaged over five runs). The plot clearly demonstrates the superiority of using a
structured covariance matrix in the SGR regularizer. (Right) Pairs of long range correlated noise
perturbed samples with increasing decay lengths ζ ∈ [1, 2, 4, 8, 12]. Top row shows original test set
images, middle shows adversarially perturbed samples, while the bottom row shows the adversarial
perturbations rescaled to fit the full range of rgb values (their actual range and hence saliency is
smaller). The footer indicates the classifier predictions on adversarial input.
regularization, we sample perturbations from a long-range correlated multivariate Gaussian with
covariance matrix specified through an exponentially decaying covariance function parametrized
by a variable decay length ζ. Inspired by the PGD covariance function, we chose intra-channel
CovFun f(r) = exp(−r/ζ) and inter-channel CovFun f(r) = 0.5 exp(−r/ζ). The corresponding
covariance matrices are depicted in Fig. 5 in the Appendix. LRC samples are shown in Fig. 3.
The worst-of-100 attack then consists in perturbing every test set data point 100 times and evaluating
the classifier accuracy against the worst of these perturbations. We tested for several decay lengths in
the range ζ ∈ [1, 2, 4, 8, 16] and attack strengths  ∈ [0.01, 0.7] with which the perturbations were
scaled. Figure 4 in the Appendix shows the accuracy of different models as a function of . As
a baseline, we also trained a model on LRC-augmented input. For SGR and GN we performed a
hyper-parameter search over λ (at fixed ζ = 8) and report results for the best performing model,
which we found to be λ=5.0 for SGR and λ=0.1 for GN.
As can be seen in Fig. 3, SGR clearly and consistently outperforms GN on long-range correlated
perturbations, achieving over 25% higher classification accuracy on LRC-perturbed input with ζ ∼ 16.
As the decay length goes to zero, the synthetic covariance matrix converges to the identity matrix and
SGR performance approaches GN performance.
Finally, to verify that those effects are not a result of our synthetically chosen covariance function,
we also performed the same experiments with the covariance matrix computed from the CIFAR10
training set, shown in Fig. 1. The accuracies for  = 0.3 are: SGR 65.8%, GN 48.7%, LRC
noise 57.9% and clean 46.5%, again confirming the benefit of using a structured covariance in the
regularizer.
4.4 White-box & Transfer Attack Accuracy
A summary of the white-box6 and transfer attack accuracies can be found in Table 1. As for the
LRC experiment, we performed a hyper-parameter search over the SGR/GN regularization strength λ.
Our aim was to get the highest possible white-box accuracy without compromising on the test set
accuracy.7 On MNIST for an attack strength of  = 32, SGR & GN achieve remarkable PGD
white-box attack accuracies of 90% compared to the 44.8% accuracy achieved by the clean model.
On CIFAR10 for =8, SGR & GN did not achieve such high white-box numbers without trading-off
test set accuracy (see non-bold diagonal entries). This is in contrast to the remarkably high white-
box accuracy achieved by the PGD-augmented model, which however comes at the expense of a
considerable drop in test set accuracy.
To investigate whether the high white-box accuracy achieved by the PDG-adversarially trained model
is due to improved robustness or whether it is in part due to adversarial training resulting in PGD
6In the white-box setting the attacker has full access to the model and is in particular able to backpropagate
through it to find adversarial perturbations.
7This is in line with the notion that a regularizer should help the model to become more robust and not
completely alter its original learning task.
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MNIST  = 32 CIFAR10  = 8
TRAIN. METH. TEST RAND FGM FGSM PGD FOOL
CLEAN 99.4 99.4 98.0 89.1 44.8 0.159
WDECAY 99.4 99.3 99.4 88.2 59.8 0.209
PGD 99.5 99.5 99.5 98.8 98.3 0.423
FGSM 99.4 99.4 99.2 98.5 96.9 0.325
GN 99.4 99.3 99.3 94.2 90.0 0.307
SGR 99.5 99.5 99.5 94.9 89.5 0.301
TRAIN. METH.
TRAIN. METH. TEST CLEAN WD PGD FGSM GN SGR
CLEAN 84.3 11.2 27.7 61.6 68.1 27.8 26.5
WDECAY 85.2 44.5 8.0 63.7 68.6 25.6 24.2
PGD 77.7 76.2 75.0 40.5 71.3 66.6 67.3
FGSM 81.2 75.9 74.0 60.3 13.2 62.9 63.8
GN 83.3 75.0 70.1 63.9 70.3 11.2 44.0
SGR 84.2 74.3 67.8 65.3 70.9 40.5 10.0
Table 1: (Left): Test set and white-box attack accuracies. (Right): Test set accuracies as well as
white-box attack (non-bold diagonal entries) and PGD-transfer attack (bold-face off-diagonal entries)
accuracies. The corresponding numbers for the other data set, as well as SGR/GN hyper-parameters
can be found in Tables 3 & 4 in the Appendix. The results are discussed in Sec. 4.4.
producing adversarial perturbations that become easier to classify8, we henceforth evaluated transfer
attack accuracies. The idea of transfer attacks is to swap adversarial samples generated by models
trained through different training methods. The PGD9 transfer attack accuracies were evaluated on
the full test set (see bold-face off-diagonal entries). All SGR variants performed equally well. We
show results for SGR-sign, see Tables 3 & 4 in the Appendix for other SGR variants. Examples of
PGD perturbed samples can be found in Figs. 7 & 8 in the Appendix.
An interesting observation can be made from the transfer attack accuracies of the clean model, shown
in the first row of the table. As can be seen, the PGD adversarial perturbations obtained from SGR/GN
trained models seem to hurt the clean model much more than the PGD perturbations obtained from
the PGD/FGSM adversarially trained models. This could be due to either (i) the SGR/GN induced
adversarial perturbations being “stronger” or (ii) the SGR/GN regularized models being similar to
the clean one, such that the transfer attack acts more like a white-box attack. Both alternatives are
good news for the regularized variants in a way. Looking at the column for PGD-adversarial samples
generated from the clean trained model, it however appears that those perturbations do not equally
hurt the SGR/GN regularized models, thus rather supporting hypothesis (i). We leave it to the reader
to assess the remaining numbers in favour of or against this conjecture.
We have already discussed the potential benefits of SGR over its simpler counterpart GN in the
case of long-range correlated perturbations. As expected, the difference between SGR and GN in
terms of white-box and transfer attack accuracies is less significant in this experiment, which can be
explained by the evident short-range nature of current adversarial attacks (see discussion in Sec. 4.2).
Reassuringly, we did not observe any loss of performance in all our experiments when using the
covariance function instead of the full covariance matrix in the SGR regularizer.
5 Related Work
A large body of related work on distributionally robust optimization [32, 9] seeks a classifier that
minimizes the worst-case loss over a family of distributions that are close to the empirical distribution
in terms of f -divergence or Wasserstein distance. While these methods aim at identifying the worst-
case distribution, we propose to efficiently approximate expectations over corrupted distributions
through the use of a regularizer informed by adversarial perturbations, which can themselves be
understood as finite budget approximations to worst-case corruptions.
Coincidentally, [30] also suggested to use gradient-norm regularization to improve the robustness
against adversarial attacks. While they investigated the effect of different gradient-norms induced
by constraints on the magnitude of the perturbations, we focused on a data-dependent structured
generalization of gradient regularization.
Much work has also been done on the connection between overfitting, generalization performance
and representational power of neural networks [6, 7, 5, 36]. Similar in spirit to our work is also the
recent work on adversarial training vs. weight decay regularization [8]. While weight decay acts on
8As hypothesized in [8], it could be that adversarial training incentivises the classifier to deliberately contort
its decision boundaries such that adversarial perturbations become easier to classify.
9PGD here refers to the attack, not to be confused with the PGD-augmented adversarially trained model. It is
always clear from the context which one is meant.
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the parameters, our regularizer acts on the function realized by the classifier. As discussed in Sec. 3.2,
the two approaches are complementary to each other and can also be combined.
From a Bayesian perspective, regularization can be understood as imposing a prior distribution over
the model parameters. As parameters in neural networks are non-identifiable, we would however
ultimately prefer to impose priors in the space of functions directly [34, 24, 23]. As pointed out in
Sec. 3.2, this is indeed one of the key properties of our regularizer.
6 Conclusion
The fact that adversarial perturbations can fool classifiers while being imperceptible to the human
eye, hints at a fundamental mismatch between how humans and classifiers try to make sense of the
data they see. We provided evidence that current adversarial attacks act by perturbing the short-range
correlations of signals. We proposed a novel structured gradient regularizer (SGR) informed by
the covariance structure of adversarial noise and presented an efficient SGR implementation with
low memory footprint. Our results suggest a flurry of future work, augmenting the theoretical and
experimental aspects of attack specific adversarial examples to a more general robustness against
structured perturbations.
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7 Appendix
7.1 SGR properties
(iii) We can gain complementary insights into SGR by explicitly computing it in terms of logits
φy(x) =
exp (ϕy(x))∑
y exp (ϕy(x))
(17)
Defining the class average of the logit-gradients as
〈∇ϕ〉 (x) :=
∑
y
∇ϕy(x)φy(x) (18)
we obtain the following expression for the structured gradient regularizer
ΩΣ(φ) =
1
2
EPˆ
[
(∇ϕy−〈∇ϕ〉)>Σ(∇ϕy−〈∇ϕ〉)
]
(19)
We can therefore see that SGR is penalizing large fluctuations of the class-conditional logit-gradients
∇ϕy around their data-dependent class average 〈∇ϕ〉. For simple one-layer softmax classifiers
ϕy(x) = ω
>
y x + by , we obtain
ΩΣ(φ) =
1
2
EPˆ
[
(ωy − 〈ω〉)>Σ (ωy − 〈ω〉)
]
(20)
This suggests an intriguing connection to variance-based regularization. Weight-decay regularization,
on the other hand, simply penalizes large norms.
7.2 Attack Hyper-parameters
An overview of the attack hyper-parameters can be found in Table 2. All of the attacks are untargeted,
meaning that they find adversarial perturbations to an arbitrary one of the K−1 other classes.
Both PGD and DeepFool are iterative attacks: they use 10 / 40 (for the white-box / transfer attack
tables) and 100 iterations respectively. The numbers reported for the DeepFool attack are computed
according to Eq. (2) in [22]. The adversarial example construction processes use the most likely label
predicted by the classifier in order to avoid label leaking [15] during adversarially augmented training.
The perturbed images returned by the attacks were clipped to lie within the original rgb range, as
is commonly done in practice. The attacks were implemented with the open source CleverHans
Library [25].
Attack Hyper-parameters
RAND  : in units of 1/255
FGSM  : in units of 1/255
PGD  : in units of 1/255
iter = /5
nb_iter = 10/40 (white-box / transfer attack tables)
DEEP FOOL overshoot : 0.02
max_iter= 100
Table 2: Attack hyper-parameters.
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7.3 Further Experimental Results
Figure 4: Long Range Correlated Noise. Classification accuracy of different models as a function of
the attack strength  for an LRC attack with a fixed decay length ζ = 8 on CIFAR10. The SGR/GN
hyper-parameters are reported in Sec. 4.3. See Fig. 3 for a plot of the accuracy of different models as
a function of the LRC attack decay length ζ ∈ [1, 16] at fixed  = 0.3.
Figure 5: Long-range structured covariance matrices corresponding to the covariance functions
defined in Sec. 4.3 for increasing decay lengths ζ ∈ [1, 2, 4, 8], as well as covariance matrix of
CIFAR10 training set (for comparison). As an alternative to the covariance function representation
described in Sec. 3.3, we can also leverage the block-structure of the full covariance matrix to obtain
a sparse representation: as can be seen in the figures, different equally distant pairs of rows are often
nearly identically correlated. Hence it is enough to estimate the covariance between a few pairs of
rows rm and rn > rm (until the correlations become sufficiently small). This amounts to for instance
estimating the covariance matrix by a diagonal and a few off-diagonal blocks.
Smoothness of Regularized Classifier At the most basic level of abstraction, adversarial vulnera-
bility is related to an overly-steep classifier gradient, such that a tiny change in the input can lead to a
large perturbation of the classifier output. In order to analyze this effect, we visualize the softmax
activations along linear trajectories between various clean and corresponding adversarial examples.
As can be seen in Fig. 6, the regularized classifier consistently leads to smooth classifier outputs.
Label leaking. Label leaking can cause models trained with adversarial examples to perform better
on perturbed than on clean inputs, as the model can learn to exploit regularities in the adversarial
example construction process [15]. This hints at a danger of overfitting to the specific attack when
training with adversarial examples. SGR regularized classifiers, on the other hand, do not suffer from
label leaking, as the adversarial examples are never directly fed to the classifier.
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MNIST  = 32 CIFAR10  = 4
TRAIN. METH TEST RAND FGM FGSM PGD FOOL
CLEAN 99.4 99.4 98.0 89.1 44.8 0.159
WDECAY 2e−4 99.4 99.3 99.4 88.2 59.8 0.209
PGD 99.5 99.5 99.5 98.8 98.3 0.423
FGSM 99.4 99.4 99.2 98.5 96.9 0.325
GN λ=5.0 99.4 99.3 99.3 94.2 90.0 0.307
SGR_GRAD λ=0.1 99.5 99.5 99.5 94.3 88.5 0.294
SGR_SIGN λ=1.0 99.5 99.5 99.5 94.9 89.5 0.301
FGSM_SGR λ=0.5 99.5 99.5 99.5 94.0 83.2 0.284
PGD_SGR λ=1.0 99.6 99.5 99.5 94.4 84.3 0.294
TRAIN. METH TEST RAND FGM FGSM PGD FOOL
CLEAN 84.0 83.5 82.7 32.4 17.0 0.012
WDECAY 5e−4 84.3 84.1 83.4 26.5 11.0 0.015
PGD 81.8 81.9 81.8 62.7 57.8 0.050
FGSM 82.1 82.1 82.2 61.6 54.0 0.046
GN λ=0.075 80.3 80.2 80.0 52.2 46.7 0.040
SGR_GRAD λ=0.1 80.2 80.0 80.2 53.7 48.1 0.042
SGR_SIGN λ=0.5 80.5 80.4 80.4 53.3 47.2 0.040
FGSM_SGR λ=0.5 81.7 81.3 81.6 53.6 46.7 0.039
PGD_SGR λ=0.5 81.5 81.2 81.3 52.5 46.5 0.039
Table 3: Test set and white-box attack accuracies. The different rows correspond to different models
evaluated against the different white-box attacks indicated above each column (with first column
showing test set accuracies). See Sec. 4.4 for a discussion of these numbers.
CIFAR10  = 4
TRAIN. METH.
TRAIN. METH. TEST CLEAN WDECAY PGD FGSM GN SGR_GRAD SGR_SIGN PGD_SGR FGSM_SGR
CLEAN 84.3 13.9 59.0 75.2 74.6 62.6 62.7 61.7 64.4 61.9
WDECAY 5e−4 85.2 68.7 9.2 75.6 75.4 61.6 61.4 59.6 63.2 61.5
PGD 81.9 80.9 80.4 56.1 76.4 77.1 77.7 77.1 77.3 77.3
FGSM 82.2 81.2 80.3 75.2 51.3 76.8 77.5 76.8 77.0 77.0
GN λ=0.05 83.3 80.0 78.0 74.3 75.2 37.0 69.7 68.9 70.2 69.4
SGR_GRAD λ=0.03 83.7 79.4 77.6 74.6 75.3 67.1 31.3 67.8 68.7 68.4
SGR_SIGN λ=0.2 84.2 80.0 77.8 75.1 75.8 68.3 69.4 33.7 69.3 68.1
PGD_SGR λ=0.35 83.2 79.4 77.7 74.2 74.9 68.6 69.6 68.3 36.2 68.9
FGSM_SGR λ=0.25 83.7 79.6 77.9 75.3 76.0 69.1 70.0 68.1 69.8 35.3
CIFAR10  = 8
TRAIN. METH.
TRAIN. METH. TEST CLEAN WDECAY PGD FGSM GN SGR_GRAD SGR_SIGN PGD_SGR FGSM_SGR
CLEAN 84.3 11.2 27.7 61.6 68.1 27.8 27.9 26.5 30.3 27.9
WDECAY 5e−4 85.2 44.5 8.0 63.7 68.6 25.6 26.2 24.2 27.7 26.5
PGD 77.7 76.2 75.0 40.5 71.3 66.6 67.9 67.3 67.1 66.9
FGSM 81.2 75.9 74.0 60.3 13.2 62.9 65.5 63.8 63.8 63.8
GN λ=0.05 83.3 75.0 70.1 63.9 70.3 11.2 45.9 44.0 47.0 45.6
SGR_GRAD λ=0.03 83.7 73.3 67.8 63.5 70.9 38.1 10.3 41.0 42.2 41.8
SGR_SIGN λ=0.2 84.2 74.3 67.8 65.3 70.9 40.5 43.6 10.0 42.8 40.5
PGD_SGR λ=0.35 83.2 74.9 69.5 65.3 70.5 43.6 46.6 43.7 10.9 44.1
FGSM_SGR λ=0.25 83.7 73.6 69.0 65.3 70.9 42.2 45.5 41.4 43.9 11.3
MNIST  = 32
TRAIN. METH.
TRAIN. METH. TEST CLEAN WDECAY PGD FGSM GN SGR_GRAD SGR_SIGN FGSM_SGR PGD_SGR
CLEAN 99.4 24.7 94.2 98.4 98.7 95.8 95.4 95.7 97.1 96.2
WDECAY 2e−4 99.4 97.7 48.3 98.1 98.7 95.4 95.2 96.4 97.4 97.0
PGD 99.5 99.3 99.3 98.2 99.2 99.1 99.1 99.3 99.3 99.2
FGSM 99.5 99.2 99.1 99.0 96.0 98.8 98.9 99.0 99.1 99.0
GN λ=5.0 99.4 98.8 98.0 98.5 98.9 88.9 96.3 97.9 98.3 98.0
SGR_GRAD λ=0.1 99.5 98.9 98.2 98.9 99.1 96.4 86.4 97.7 98.5 98.0
SGR_SIGN λ=1.0 99.5 98.8 98.3 98.8 98.9 97.5 97.2 86.9 98.1 97.9
FGSM_SGR λ=0.5 99.5 98.7 97.8 98.7 98.7 97.3 97.0 97.1 72.9 96.9
PGD_SGR λ=1.0 99.6 98.7 98.0 98.8 98.8 97.3 96.8 97.3 97.5 79.5
MNIST  = 64
TRAIN. METH.
TRAIN. METH. TEST CLEAN WDECAY PGD FGSM GN SGR_GRAD SGR_SIGN FGSM_SGR PGD_SGR
CLEAN 99.4 0.6 30.3 79.6 79.1 31.5 32.6 38.1 72.4 65.8
WDECAY 2e−4 99.4 80.6 0.4 84.0 88.4 26.4 27.4 46.7 81.3 75.6
PGD 99.5 98.8 97.7 62.6 90.7 89.7 89.7 92.4 97.7 97.2
FGSM 99.5 98.0 93.7 76.8 38.6 81.8 81.8 84.0 94.6 92.1
GN λ=5.0 99.4 96.3 86.5 91.3 96.4 9.3 55.0 79.5 93.2 90.7
SGR_GRAD λ=0.1 99.5 96.1 84.7 90.2 95.3 50.1 4.5 68.8 89.6 82.9
SGR_SIGN λ=1.0 99.5 95.1 83.6 88.8 93.4 59.0 52.7 2.4 85.3 82.7
FGSM_SGR λ=0.5 99.5 90.8 74.9 85.6 85.7 54.0 48.5 48.4 0.4 49.1
PGD_SGR λ=1.0 99.6 92.9 78.1 87.8 89.8 50.9 44.0 56.1 62.1 0.5
Table 4: PGD transfer attack accuracies. The different rows correspond to different models evaluated
on PGD adversarial perturbations generated from the corresponding models indicated above each
column (with first column showing test set accuracies). Note that the PGD & FGSM models were
trained separately for each . See Sec. 4.4 for a discussion of these numbers.
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SGR regularized model
Clean model
Figure 6: Softmax activations along a linear trajectory between a clean sample and plus/minus five
times the  = 4 PGD adversarial perturbation for an SGR regularized classifier (top) and a clean
classifier (bottom) on CIFAR10.
7.4 Classifier Architectures
All networks were trained for 50 epochs using the Adam optimizer [13] with learning rate 0.001 and
minibatch size 128.
Classifier
Feature Block Conv2D (filter size: 3× 3, feature maps: params[0], stride: 1× 1)ReLU
Feature Block Conv2D (filter size: 3× 3, feature maps: params[1], stride: 1× 1)ReLU
MaxPooling MaxPool (pool size: (2,2))
Feature Block Conv2D (filter size: 3× 3, feature maps: params[2], stride: 1× 1)ReLU
Feature Block Conv2D (filter size: 3× 3, feature maps: params[3], stride: 1× 1)ReLU
MaxPooling MaxPool (pool size: (2,2))
Fully-Connected Dense (units: params[4])
Fully-Connected Dense (units: params[5])
Fully-Connected Dense (units: params[6])Softmax
Table 5: Classifier Architectures: CIFAR10 params=[64, 64, 128, 128, 256, 256, 10], MNIST
params= [32, 32, 64, 64, 200, 200, 10]. Our models are identical to those used in [3, 27].
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Figure 7: PGD samples for clean model on MNIST. (Left half) for  = 32, (right half) for  = 64.
Top row shows original test set images sorted according to their true class label, middle shows
adversarially perturbed samples, while the bottom row shows the adversarial perturbations rescaled
to fit the full range of rgb values (their actual range and hence saliency is smaller).
Figure 8: PGD samples for clean model on CIFAR10. (Left half) for  = 4, (right half) for  = 8.
Top row shows original test set images sorted according to their true class label, middle shows
adversarially perturbed samples, while the bottom row shows the adversarial perturbations rescaled
to fit the full range of rgb values (their actual range and hence saliency is smaller).
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